2017-03-09 14:07

无论如何建立一个民主政权的到来,它的整合可能是最困难的过程中的一部分,特别是如果旧政权的精英希望破坏一个新的民主政府。新的民主国家,委内瑞拉出现在上世纪50年代后期是一个很好的例子,卡尔写道:“尽管长期的结构性变化,加强了新兴的社会力量在传统的利益为代价,新演员来定义不同的顺序的能力总是被持续的权力约束,或出现权力“怀旧“精英试图限制改革”(P210奥唐奈等人1986)。在委内瑞拉的过渡最初看到一些工会精英之间的共识,工厂老板和新政府妥协产生一个紧急计划,以获得经济和运行后推翻Perez Jimenez。担心美国寻求保护其石油投资在委内瑞拉的问题,特别是在瓜地马拉的改革派推翻危地马拉阿本斯政府的参与光。然而这是一群右翼军官拒绝接受合法的新政府,对民主转型的最大威胁,企图政变是最戏剧性的企图破坏了民主行动的力量(AD)领导的政府。事实上,在委内瑞拉,这是一个群体的共识-石油公司,教会,美国和军队-一起保护传统的精英利益,极大地影响了在其民主的早期民主政策的制定在委内瑞拉。新政府不得不与前政权的强大的精英妥协。卡尔描述的过程是这样的:“为了适应新的需求和欲望在政治上有组织的演员没有明显威胁那些强大到足以扭转改变的过程中的利益,民主化需要对游戏的动作和规则的新的参数的一个明确的定义,包括正式的和非正式的,可以保证基本目标,所有的演员”(P212奥唐奈等人1986)。这种谈判的结果是建立一批精英协商协议1958,锁仍然在发生在早期的Batancourt政府和约束所有国家签署同样的基本的政治经济纲领,无论选举结果。真正的民主可能是关键的条约他们带走一些民选政府自由设定自己的路线,然而这样的政治精英之间的妥协是必要的在委内瑞拉减少迅速回到独裁或军事统治的可能性。


Regardless as to how the establishing of a democratic regime comes about, its consolidation can be the most difficult part of the process, particularly if elites from the old regime look to undermine a new democratic government. The new democracy that emerged in Venezuela in the late 1950s is a case in point, with Karl writing: “although long-term structural changes had strengthened emerging social forces at the expense of traditional interests, the ability of new actors to define a different order was always constrained by the persistent power, or the appearance of power of “nostalgic” elites who sought to limit reform” (p210 O’Donnell et al 1986). The transition in Venezuela had initially seen some consensus between elites as trade unions, factory owners and the new government compromised to produce an Emergency Plan to get the economy up and running after that overthrow of Perez Jimenez. The fear of the US looking to protect its oil investments was a problem in Venezuela, particularly in the light of its involvement in the overthrow of the reformist Arbenz government in Guatemala. However it was a group of right wing army officers that refused to accept the legitimacy of the new government that posed the greatest threat to the democratic transition, with an attempted coup being the most dramatic of their attempts to undermine the power of the Accion Democratica (AD) led government. In fact, in Venezuela, it was a consensus of groups – the oil companies, the Church, the US and the military – joined together to protect traditional elite interests that greatly affected policy making in Venezuela in the early years of its democracy. The new government had to compromise with the powerful elites from the former regime. Karl describes the process as such: “in order to accommodate the demands and desires of new politically organised actors without significantly threatening the interests of those who were strong enough to reverse the process of change, democratisation required an explicit definition of the new parameters of action and rules of the game, both formal and informal which could guarantee the basic objectives of all actors” (p212 O’Donnell et al 1986). The result of such negotiation were the establishment of a number of interlocking elite-negotiated pacts in 1958 that remained in place during the early years of the Batancourt administration and bound all signatories to the same basic political and economic programme, regardless of electoral outcomes. True democrats may have been critical of the pacts as they did take away some of the freedoms of an elected administration to set its own course, yet such compromise between political elites were necessary in Venezuela to lessen the possibility of a swift return to authoritarian or military rule.